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NATIONAL TAX POLICY AND GLOBAL
COMPETITION
Jack M. Mintz*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past two decades, we have witnessed a deepening of
economic integration at the international level. Most industri-
alized countries have seen an increase in exports, imports, and
inbound and outbound capital flows as a share of GDP. Service
industries, which have dominated employment growth in the
past decade, increasingly have become subject to international
competition. Many businesses are now multinational with
investments in at least two countries and alliances with for-
eign partners. Moreover, we are observing an era of interna-
tional consolidation of businesses, which results in the creation
of large global entities that have the flexibility to transform
business inputs from different parts of the world into products
and services to be sold worldwide.
The process of globalization has raised a number of con-
cerns with respect to the capacity of governments to pursue
national tax policies in the interest of funding public goods and
services. Some experts have warned that "globalization" will
result in smaller governments since it will be more difficult to
tax mobile businesses and individuals who can shift their ac-
tivities to low-tax jurisdictions. Others have argued that gov-
ernments increasingly will shift taxes away from capital in-
come to consumption or payroll since income from capital is
internationally mobile and can escape taxation. Further, others
have suggested that industrialized countries will need to har-
monize their tax policies with those of other countries. This is
illustrated by recent initiatives of the Organization of Econom-
ic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the European
Union (EU) to curtail "harmful tax competition" or to agree to
a code of conduct.
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Given the potential impact of international economic inte-
gration on the ability of national governments to raise reve-
nues, there is much at stake. The most important taxes levied
by OECD countries are personal income, payroll, and consump-
tion taxes.' Corporate income taxes are less than 10% of reve-
nues for many countries.' Property taxes and other wealth
taxes are relatively small sources of revenue.
Globalization can make it much more difficult for govern-
ments to levy the two most popular taxes today: income and
value-added taxes (VAT). The income tax, which includes the
corporate income tax, will be more difficult to levy since the
source of income will be harder to determine, especially for
multinational corporations. As Mintz and Chen2 have argued,
the corporate income tax is likely to whither given the rapid
reductions in statutory corporate income tax rates around the
world. The growth of the multinational sector will make it
increasingly difficult for governments to tax corporate income
that is harder to define within the jurisdiction. With the de-
mise of the corporate income, the personal income tax, which
depends on income derived from corporations, will be more
difficult to levy since individuals will be able to avoid the pay-
ment of personal income tax on income left at the corporate
level. Consumption taxes, especially the VAT, also will face
pressures since the VAT on service transactions depends on
determining the place of supply. If the service income can be
stripped out of income from one jurisdiction to another, govern-
ments will be competing for VAT base, just like under the
corporate income tax.
If governments try to shift away from income and VAT to
other sources of revenue, alternative taxes may become too
inefficient to levy. For example, high payroll taxes, which exist
in the EU (except the United Kingdom), are often avoided by
contracting work to self-employed workers rather than by hir-
ing employees. High property taxes result in distortions in the
use of land and structures. Thus, while some taxes are less af-
fected by globalization in terms of their administrative and
economic practicalities, they cannot fully substitute for any
losses in income and other tax revenues.
1. See Table 1.
2. Jack M. Mintz & Duanjie Chen, Will the Corporate Income Tax Wither?, in
WORLD TAX CONFERENCE REPORT (qanadian Tax Found., 2000).
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The worldwide financial turbulence of 1997 might raise
questions as to whether "globalization" will be a process facing
near death. However, despite some dire warnings of the end of
worldwide capitalism, we must remember that technological
innovations that have resulted in the recent internationaliza-
tion of business cannot be reversed in the long run. The pace of
globalization may slow down as businesses and governments
may be more cautious about the benefits. But globalization as
a process is not about to stop since there are substantial na-
tional benefits arising from the international transfer of tech-
nology and management skills.
This article will discuss how globalization will impact on
national tax policies. Although there are a number of pressures
that will be felt by tax systems worldwide, governments have
several strategies available to them that would not necessarily
lead to a loss of independent policy. In fact, globalization might
present opportunities that could result in better fiscal decisions
over time.
I. GLOBALIZATION
A. What Do We Mean by "Globalization?"
Some analysts view "globalization" simply as the increased
mobility of business inputs--especially capital-to other parts
of the world.' The effect of "globalization" is, therefore, to
make inputs much more sensitive to differences in net-of-tax
incomes earned in countries. Thus, any changes in economic
conditions, including fiscal policies of governments, would have
a substantial impact on the flow of capital and other related
business inputs between countries. Under this definition of
3. Typical studies tend to model globalization as greater mobility of portfolio
capital across national boundaries. For a different approach, see, for example,
Eckhard Janeba, Corporate Income Tax Competition, Double Taxation Treaties and
Foreign Direct Investment, 60 J. PUB. ECON., 423, 423-45 (1996). See also Jack M.
Mintz & Henry Tulkens, Optimality Properties of Alternative Systems of Taxation
of Foreign Direct Investment, 60 J. PUB. ECON., 373, 373-400 (1996) (using an
approach that models capital mobility explicitly for foreign direct investment). For
a recent empirical approach that uses an aggregate international production func-
tion for firms rather than country-specific independent production functions to
show how national tax policies affect multinationals, see ROSANNE ALTSHULER &
JASON G. CUMMINS, TAX POLICY AND THE DYNAMIC DEMAND FOR DOMESTIC AND
FOREIGN CAPITAL BY MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS (Technical Comm. on Bus.
Taxation, Working Paper No. 97-4, Finance Canada 1997).
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"globalization," governments would tend to avoid taxing inter-
nationally mobile factors of production since the economic cost
of the tax is greatest when business inputs easily flow to other
jurisdictions. Instead, governments would prefer to tax immo-
bile factors, including real estate and unskilled labor, since the
economic cost of imposing the tax is less for these immobile
bases.
In my view, the above common definition of "globalization"
is too narrow and misses an important element of the process.
Although the mobility of business inputs is an important as-
pect of "globalization," one easily could focus on portfolio capi-
tal-bonds and other financial assets-to study the effect of
"globalization" on fiscal policies of governments. This would be
too simplistic of an approach. Instead, "globalization" is a rich-
er process that implies more than just the mobility of business
inputs. When businesses become multinational, they are able
to produce goods and services from complementary inputs that
are linked within a single process across different countries.
The operations of a multinational enterprise cannot be viewed
as the sum of entities operating in each country since produc-
tion in one country is not independent of the multinational's
operations in other countries.
Therefore, the problems that arise for national tax policies
are twofold. First, it can be difficult to measure the mobile tax
base since income or transactions are not easily identified to a
particular location. Second, differential tax policies across
countries can impact on the efficiency of worldwide production
since businesses seek to allocate resources to tax-favored re-
gions of the world. The interconnectedness of business produc-
tion at the international level is at the heart of why a country
might be so concerned about the international competitiveness
of its economy.
B. Implications of Globalization for Tax Policy
The implications of "globalization" are profound. Tax policy
requires not only the identification of the tax bases, but also
the ability of governments to tax them. The specific issues
raised by globalization can be divided into three distinct areas.
The first set is related to movements of physical inputs (peo-
ple, machines, structures, and inventories). The second set is
related to the shifting of reported profits. The third set is relat-
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ed to the administrative problems of measuring income earned
at source. The following list includes some examples.
1. Movements of Physical Inputs
With globalization, differences in tax regimes across coun-
tries will have a more profound influence on the allocation of
capital. Thus, international tax systems significantly will dis-
tort business decision-making at the international level. For
example, elements of double taxation will deter cross-border
transactions while tax-planning opportunities will result in
excessive cross-border transactions.
Historically, countries tend to tax more heavily industries
with substantial economic rents, including resource-based,
manufacturing, banks, and utilities. However, globalization is
making it more difficult to tax such rents (except for origin-
based rents associated with resource industries) since some
inputs can be shifted to foreign jurisdictions. Moreover, eco-
nomic rents increasingly are related to services and technologi-
cal innovation that is not tied to a location. Consumption taxa-
tion offers a way for governments to tax rents at the interna-
tional level as such rents are incorporated in the prices of
imported goods and services.
Larger countries tend to attract resources because of "ag-
glomeration" effects-businesses locate near each other to pool
information and have greater access to heterogeneous labor
resources. Thus, these countries may find it easier to "export"
taxes onto foreign jurisdictions by taxing products or capital
that result in higher prices on exports or lower incomes earned
by foreigners.
With globalization, cross-border movement of employees is
becoming a more significant factor for businesses. In turn,
employee relocation has created a number of complexities for
personal income and payroll tax systems in determining resi-
dence to avoid double taxation of income or to ensure that
individuals do not escape taxation altogether.
2. Income Shifting
Countries find that high tax rates for very mobile tax
bases result in significant base erosion. This is especially an
issue for income taxes, including corporate income and with-
holding taxes. Even though physical capital may not be as
20011 1289
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mobile, profits are very mobile and respond to differences in
statutory tax rates across countries. Taxpayers are able to
easily shift profits by changing their financial structures or
manipulating transfer prices for transactions. A country with a
high corporate income tax rate therefore can lose substantial
revenue to other jurisdictions even if the physical input does
not move.4
Cross-border flows of income, especially interest, royalties,
and fees, have created pressures on governments to reduce
withholding taxes on payments since the non-residents may
not be able to credit withholding taxes on gross payments
against taxes paid to their own governments on net income.
.Finally, third-country financing provides opportunities for
multinationals to deduct expenditures for interest or service
contracts, more than once, by routing income through interme-
diary entities that are little taxed (or not at all).
3. Inability to Administer Taxes
Under the income tax, globalization makes it more difficult
to determine where mobile income is earned for tax purposes.
If we cannot say that a taxpayer is a resident of a particular
country or has earned a particular source of income in the
jurisdiction, then it is impossible to levy the tax on the basis of
"residency" or "source."'
Under the VAT systems, the identification of the place of
the transaction makes it more problematic to determine which
country has the right to tax export and import transactions.
For example, VAT may be applied on services used to process
goods in a country for export. Intangible expenditures by busi-
nesses can be used to strip value-added from one jurisdiction to
another where little or no tax applies (e.g., royalties for re-
search and development).
The taxation of financial services is already problematic at
4. See JAMES R. HINES, TAX POLICY AND THE ACTMTIES OF MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS (Nat. Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5589, 1996).
See also VIJAY JOG, & JIANMIN TANG, TAX REFORM, DEBT SHIFTING AND TAX REV-
ENUES: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN CANADA (Technical Comm. on Bus. Taxa-
tion, Working Paper No. 97-14, Finance Canada 1997).
5. See Richard M. Bird & J. Scott Wilkie, Source vs. Residence Based Taxa-
tion in the European Union: The Wrong Question?, in TAXING CAPITAL INCOME THE
EUROPEAN UNION (S. Cnossen ed., 2000).
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the international level for income tax systems. Financial de-
rivatives make it more difficult to distinguish between income
and capital gains since asset returns can be replicated by a
combination of financial derivatives (such as zero coupon
bonds, calls, and puts) that could result in quite different tax
results.' Financial income is almost impossible to tax at the
international level under the arm's length and separate ac-
counting principles. Transfer pricing regimes now effectively
use allocation methods to determine how global financial trad-
er income should be apportioned across countries.
The growth of electronic commerce will have a significant
impact on the ability of governments to levy income and sales
taxes on bases harder to identify, especially for transactions
made that are outside of the government's jurisdiction.' Con-
cepts such as "permanent establishment" and "carrying on
business" will be more difficult to apply unless governments
agree to a common set of rules to determine how Web-based
transactions will be subject to tax. Further, electronic com-
merce can create new opportunities for taxpayers to evade
taxes and launder money.
C. Inefficiencies of Uncoordinated Tax Policies
The above examples demonstrate the pressures that glob-
alization can have on the development of national tax policies,
especially with respect to income, withholding, and, to a cer-
tain extent, consumption and payroll taxes. Generally, taxation
policies of one jurisdiction not only have a significant impact
on the efficiency of its own economy but also on the efficiency
of other economies linked to it.
Economists identify two sources of inefficiency that arise
from the uncoordinated actions of governments in determining
their tax policies. The first inefficiency is "tax exportation;"
whereby one jurisdiction will increase its taxes on bases know-
ing that non-residents will bear the tax (e.g., on intermediary
products sold abroad, tourists, or income paid to foreigners).
6. See H. David Rosenbloom & Diane Ring, General Report, Tax Aspects of
Derivative Financial Instruments, in STUDIES ON INTERNATIONAL FIScAL LAW (Int'l
Fiscal Ass'n, Kluwer, 1995).
7. Charles E. McLure Jr., The Taxation of Electronic Commerce: Background
and Proposal (1999) (mimeograph, on file with the Hoover Inst., Stanford Univ.).
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The tax exportation inefficiency results in tax rates that are
set "too high" since a government only is concerned about the
harmful impact of taxes on the welfare of its own citizens, not
on the welfare of citizens in other countries. Tax exportation
results in barriers to the free flow of goods and services, and
tax prices for public goods and services become distorted in the
presence of tax exportation opportunities.
The second inefficiency is related to "tax base flight"
whereby higher taxes in one country may cause the tax base to
flee to neighboring jurisdictions with more favorable tax sys-
tems. The "tax base flight" inefficiency results in tax rates that
are "too low" since a government does not take into account the
beneficial impact of "tax-base flight" that increases the amount
of resources received by other jurisdictions. With "tax base
flight," some cross-border transactions are taxed lightly and
perhaps, not subject to tax at all.
In theory, at the international level, these inefficiencies
imply that all countries are made worse off in terms of reduced
economic output since tax distortions inhibit the free flow of
resources across international boundaries. Thus, there are
gains to international cooperation to improve national tax
systems by reducing fiscal distortions. Countries can maximize
their opportunities for economic growth and job creation if they
coordinate actions to improve tax systems. Further, without
international cooperation, national policies can be constrained
by globalization since some taxes are more difficult to levy.
III. How COULD GOVERNMENTS RESPOND?
In practice, however, the best response for a government
in designing its tax policies is to choose the most efficient tax
system that is both possible and in its own interest. There are
various actions that can be taken by governments in response
to globalization and these include:
A. stop globalization;
B. reduce the size of government;
C. change the tax mix;
D. globalize taxes with major trading partners; and,
E. create a national advantage in global markets.
[Vol. XXVI:41292
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A. Stopping Globalization: The "Island" Mentality
If globalization is a "problem" that constrains national tax
policies, one response is to try to make the "problem" go away,
or at least reduce its impact on independent national policies,
by reducing the international mobility of the tax base. Such
constraints, would allow a country to operate more as an is-
land, limiting access to its resources. Capital controls, a
"Tobin" tax on financial transactions, work permit restrictions,
tariffs on imported goods, and export taxes are all examples of
"island mentality" policies, whereby governments might try to
lessen the dependence of an economy on the international
economy so that sovereign national policies are less con-
strained by globalization.
While such policies are often popular as a "quick fix," they
can be very costly to an economy in the long run. The analogy
can be found with trade protection. We know that import com-
petition can hurt domestic industries so that there is a desire
to reduce import competition faced by these industries. Howev-
er, we also know that free trade that allows for increased spe-
cialization in the export of those goods and services in which a
country has comparative advantage can result in substantial
economic gains to the economy.
An attempt by a government to stop the forces of global-
ization increases the risk that its economy will be left out of
eventual economic productivity resulting from the internation-
al transfer of technology and innovative management.' We
have seen what happens when countries such as China and
India try to shield themselves from international influenc-
es-they might be able to control better their destinies, but at
the cost of lower economic growth in the long run since they
cut off access to technology and management.
Thus, despite recent anxiety over international financial
instability and the resulting risks to the world economy, it is
doubtful that countries would wish to take on an "island men-
tality" by limiting the trade of goods, services, and capital.
8. See, e.g., PIERRE FORTIN, THE CANADIAN STANDARD OF LIVING: IS THERE A
WAY UP? (C.D. Howe Inst. 1999).
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B. Cutting Down the Size of Governments
If globalization makes it harder to impose taxes on mobile
factors (even though it is more feasible to export taxes on for-
eigners), governments could respond by reducing their size to
levels not seen since the 1960s. As public economists have
pointed out, an efficient allocation of resources between public
and private goods in the economy is achieved when the bene-
fits from public expenditures is at least as great as the eco-
nomic cost of taxation. If globalization causes resources to shift
easily to low-tax foreign jurisdictions, then the economic cost of
raising additional tax revenue is greater, which therefore im-
plies that public expenditure should be reduced. For an ex-
treme case, such as in the case of financial capital, the base
may be so mobile that there is little point in taxing it at all.
Despite the trend towards international globalization dur-
ing the past two decades, governments have increased the
amounts of resources they draw from the economy. As shown
in Table 2,' the tax/GDP ratios of OECD countries generally
have increased from the period 1976 to 1995.0 Governments
have gotten larger rather than smaller in the face of globaliza-
tion. However, as pointed out in several studies, the increased
size of government has arguably reduced the annual economic
growth rate of a country by almost one half point per year.1
Moreover, governments seem to be peaking in size and some
have argued that governments should be no more than 30% of
GDP.12
Without international coordination of tax policies, one
response to globalization that likely will be seen over the com-
ing years is for governments to become more efficient and
provide fewer public goods and services so taxes can be re-
duced. Some countries with significant market power, however,
may be able to maintain relatively high tax/GDP ratios if they
9. See Table 2.
10. If government expenditure relative to GDP were measured, a similar pic-
ture would evolve. The difference between revenues and expenditures are public
deficits that grew during most of this period.
11. See Eric Engen & Jonathan Skinner, Taxation and Economic Growth, 49
NAT'L TAX J., 617, 617-42 (1996). See also PATRICK CARAGATA, THE ECONOMIC AND
COMPLIANCE CONSEQUENCES OF TAXATION: A REPORT ON THE HEALTH OF THE TAX
SYSTEM IN NEW ZEALAND (Kluwer Acad. Publishers 1998).
12. See Vrro TANzI & LUDGER SCHUKNECHT, PUBLIC SPENDING IN THE 20TH
CENTURY: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (Cambridge University Press 2000).
1294 [Vol. =XV:4
NATIONAL TAX POLICY
are able to rely on taxes that largely are exported to foreign-
ers.
C. Changing the Tax Mix
A third response to globalization is to change the mix of
taxes by relying less on bases that are mobile and more on
those that are less mobile. Specifically, some have argued that
governments should eliminate taxes on mobile capital income
in favour of taxes on consumption or payrolls. Others have
suggested relying more on "benefit" taxation whereby the taxes
are more closely matched to specific program expenditures
(this would include user fees for public-provided goods and
services)."3
There may be much to commend for economic reasons to
shift tax bases to consumption, payroll, or benefit taxes. The
elimination of taxes on capital income that could be achieved
under alternative taxes would reduce the bias of income taxes
against savings and improve incentives for investments in
technology and human capital that can have important effects
on productivity.'4 However, as discussed above, globalization
does not necessarily imply that alternatives will be that easy
to impose. VATs for international transactions are difficult to
handle (especially determining the place of supply for services).
Payroll taxes on employment can be avoided by contracting
services from self-employed individuals-including foreigners.
Benefit taxation also may be difficult to impose at high rates
since imported goods and services may not bear similar levels
of tax.
Even if some taxes, other than those on income, are argu-
ably better from an economic point of view, governments have
been reluctant to eliminate income taxes since they play a
significant role in achieving fairness in the tax system. There-
fore, globalization impedes the use of some tax powers by na-
tional governments and constrains the choices they make. In
other words, globalization results in a bias towards the taxa-
13. For a very thorough discussion of user fees and benefit taxation, see Rich-
ard M. Bird & Thomas Tsiopoulos, User Charges for Public Services: Potentials
and Problems, 45 CAN. TAX J. 25 (1997).
14. However, as pointed out in some studies, the more narrow tax base would
result in higher taxes on work effort. See Alan J. Auerbach et al., The Efficiency
Gains from Dynamic Tax Reform, 24 INT'L ECON. REV. 81 (1983).
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tion of more immobile tax bases that would otherwise not be
taxed as much by governments if globalization was a less im-
portant factor.
The reality is that those governments that tend to rely
more greatly on taxes on mobile bases will find it in their best
interest to shift taxes to more immobile bases over time.
D. Coordination of Global Taxes
An alternative to reducing the size of governments or
changing the tax mix is for countries to improve the coordina-
tion of tax policies at the international level. One type of coor-
dination is to make a country's tax system more similar to
others-in other words, harmonize taxes. Other approaches
include agreements to minimum or maximum rates of tax,
bilateral agreements to avoid the double taxation of cross-bor-
der flows of income, transfer pricing, competent authority ar-
rangements, and multilateral agreements to curtail "harmful"
tax competition (assuming "harmful" can be defined or agreed
upon). All these forms of coordination result in what I would
term as "global taxes." The extreme form of a global tax is for
governments to agree to a similar base and rate and allocate
revenues according to some revenue sharing formula as seen in
many federations.
A global tax reduces the sovereign power of a government
since bilateral or multilateral agreements limit national discre-
tion. However, such agreements may provide more policy flexi-
bility for a government compared to not imposing a tax on a
mobile base. If governments wish to maintain income tax and
VAT systems, they may prefer to seek global tax arrangements
rather than choose less efficient or equitable taxes.
In my own view, we are at the cusp of global arrange-
ments with respect to income taxes and VATs. The taxation of
mobile bases, which are increasingly difficult to assess at the
international level, will force governments to seek alternative
arrangements to tax corporations and individuals. One of these
arrangements is to harmonize taxes with neighbouring coun-
tries. For example, the recent consolidation of businesses from
national to supra-European entities is a noticeable trend that
will create greater pressures on the EU members to harmonize
corporate income taxes. Indeed, the EU already has eliminated
withholding taxes for cross-border flows of income since the
[Vol. =XV:41296
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early 1990s and has come to an arrangement to harmonize
VAT policies with respect to cross-border trade.
Even the allocation method increasingly is becoming im-
portant for the determination of income within a jurisdiction.
Given the administrative problems in measuring income for a
country on a non-arm's length basis for multinational compa-
nies, transfer pricing methods based on the allocation of profits
associated with a transaction are forcing governments towards
an allocation method. 5 Already, global financial trading in-
come is effectively taxed on an allocation basis.
E. Creating the National Advantage
Rather than trying simply to be reactive, a country could
choose to be proactive in its policies by embracing globaliza-
tion. Policies could be geared to improve productivity, such as
encouraging workers to acquire skills through education, im-
proving infrastructure, and research and development. The
intent would be to create a national advantage so that the
economy can realize growth potential through international
trade and economic linkages.
There are two general approaches for tax policy that can
foster a national advantage. The first approach is a concerted
effort made by governments, businesses, and households to join
together in a coordinated national plan of action that would
result in improved productivity. This approach, similar to the
Asian national plans that fostered growth until recently, would
require the public and private sectors to set achievable objec-
tives for national economic planning. Such coordination, how-
ever, does have its limitations. It requires participants to be
knowledgeable about the future-this could make private and
public sectors less responsive to actual economic trends as they
unfold after plans have been set. Further, many of the Asian
countries undertook plans that targeted subsidies and tax
incentives to certain industries since winners and losers had to
be picked. However, it is not always apparent which industries
are to be winners in the future.
The second approach is to foster competition and a level-
playing field in the private sector. Taxes would be kept as low
15. See Jack M. Mintz, Globalizing the Corporate Income Tax: The Use of
Allocation, 56 FINANZARCHIV 3/4 (July 1999).
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as possible by ensuring that governments are efficient in the
delivery of needed public services. Public policies would be
reformed to reduce those barriers that impede economic effi-
ciency and misallocate resources. Taxes would, therefore, be
levied on broad bases with low rates. Incentives only would be
provided if there were clear market failures resulting in inap-
propriate levels of activities. This approach, recently common
to several Latin American economies, helps to create an eco-
nomic environment that is conducive to economic growth by
creating a clear national advantage.
IV. CONCLUSION: IMMEDIATE IMPLICATIONS FOR
INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRY TAX POLICIES
Industrialized countries' tax structures likely will undergo
considerable change over the coming years. The most pressing
issue will be with respect to corporate tax systems. As shown
in Table 3,1" corporate tax systems have undergone substan-
tial reform throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The typical case
reform in the 1980s was to broaden the tax base and to lower
corporate income tax rates; with either corporate revenues
kept constant or increased as in the United States and Cana-
da. Reforms in the 1990s are taking on a different shape. Gov-
ernments are reducing corporate income tax rates even further.
However, in some cases, such as Italy, they are shifting busi-
ness taxes from levies on profits to a wider base such as value-
added (origin-basis). Business taxes are also shifting from
taxes on income to profit-insensitive taxes such as on capital,
property, or business inputs, as shown for Canada." Mintz
and Chen have shown that the average statutory corporate
income tax rate has fallen from almost 48% in the early 1980s,
to roughly 34% in 2000.18 Rates are to be even further re-
duced in many countries including Canada, Germany, and
Ireland. Given tax competition and administrative pressures
on the corporate income tax, one could expect even further
reductions in corporate income tax rates as governments try to
shore up corporate revenues.
The shrinkage of corporate income taxes, and perhaps,
16. See Table 3.
17. Technical Comm. on Bus. Taxation [1998], Report, Fin. Can., Ottawa.
18. See Mintz, supra note 2.
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their eventual demise will have a profound impact on tax
structures. Personal taxes on capital income would be harder
to levy and governments likely would rely on increased taxa-
tion of payroll and property as substitutes. Governments possi-
bly will look towards greater reliance on user fees and benefit
taxes to fund public expenditures.
Revenues will be harder for governments to raise, thereby
making it more difficult for governments to grow as they have
in the past 40 years. However, all this may create incentives to
spend and tax smarter over time with a more efficient use of
public resources. This may not be a bad outcome at all.
BROOK. J. INTL L.
Table 1
International Comparisons: Tax Mix in 1992-1995
(as a percentage of GDP)
Canada United States United G-7
Kingdom (unweighted)
Personal 13.8 9.8 9.6 9.7
Income Tax
Corporate 2.3 2.3 2.8 2.7
Income Tax
Property Tax 4.0 3.2 3.4 2.8
Social Security 6.1 7.0 6.2 11.0
Goods and 9.5 4.9 12.1 9.3
Services
Total* 36.5 28.2 34.5 36.0
*Other taxes are included in the total calculation.
Source: Revenue Statistics 1965-1996, Organization for Economic Growth and
Development, 1997 Edition.
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Canada United States United Weighted OECD
Kingdom Average G-7 Average
1976-79 31.1 26.5 33.9 31.3 33.0
1980-83 32.9 28.8 37.0 34.5 34.0
1984-87 33.6 26.1 37.7 36.2 35.2
1988-91 35.6 29.4 36.4 36.4 36.2
1992-95 36.5 29.8 34.5 37.2 37.3
Notes: Weighted average G-7 tax/GDP ratio is the G-7 tax/GDP ratio, weighted by the
proportion of GDP to the total GDP of all G-7 countries.
Source: Revenue Statistics 1965-1996, Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development, 1997 edition
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Table 3
Corporate Income Tax Changes Relating to Base and Rate Schedule since 1986*
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada*
Czech Republic***
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary***
Iceland
Ireland**
Italy
Japan
Korea, South
Luxembourg
Mexico***
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Poland***
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States
Year for Year for
Base Broadening Rate reduction
1988 1988
2000 1993/1995/2000
1989 1989
1994 1994
1989 1989
1988 1988191
1995/96
1990 1990/1991/1992
1993 1993
1989 1990/1991
1993
1989/1990/1992
1990
1999/2000 1996/97/98199/2000
1988
1993
1988
1995/97/98/99
1989
1998
1988/1989
1998
1999
1987/88189
1988
1988
1992
1997/98/9912000
1989
1998
1989/1991 1989/1991
1994
1993/98
1994/99
1986/1987 1986/1990/1991
1997/99
1987 1987
CIT Rate (%) Rate change
in 1985 in 2000 (percentage point)
46.0 30.0 (2001) -16.0
55.0 34.0 -21.0
45.0 40.2
49.0 43.5
NA 35.0
50.0 34.0
59.0 28.0
50.0 36.7
64.8 38.0 (2001)
49.0 37.5
NA 18.0
51.0 30.0
50.0 28.0
52.2 41.3
58.6 41.0 -17.6
35.0 35.0
52.0 28.0
34.0 27.8
49.2**** 40.7
40.0 30.0
51.0 40.0
*Source: Mintz and Chen [2000]. ** With lower rate applicable to manufacturing or certain international
financial sectors. *** Not a member of OECD in early 1990s. ****The 1991 rate.
